Reports

In September 2022, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) alerted U.S. Department of Labor to over $45 billion in potential fraud paid in four high-risk areas. One high-risk area was Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants filing with Social Security numbers (SSN) of deceased persons. Through Employment and Training Administration (ETA), the OIG provided states with underlying methodology as well as specific claimant information for follow-up action. This audit will examine the extent to which ETA and states have taken action to follow up on potentially fraudulent CARES Act UI claims filed with SSNs of deceased persons identified and referred by the OIG.

In September 2022, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) alerted U.S. Department of Labor to over $45 billion in potential fraud paid in four high-risk areas. One high-risk area was UI claimants filing with Social Security numbers (SSNs) of federal prisoners. Through Employment and Training Administration (ETA), the OIG provided states with underlying methodology as well as specific claimant information for follow-up action. This audit will examine the extent to which ETA and states have taken action to follow up on potentially fraudulent CARES Act Unemployment Insurance (UI)claims filed with SSNs of federal prisoners identified and referred by the OIG. 

In September 2022, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) alerted the U.S. Department of Labor to over $45 billion in potential fraud paid in four high-risk areas. Multistate claimants were the largest high-risk area. Through Employment and Training Administration (ETA) the OIG provided states with underlying methodology as well as specific claimant information for follow-up action. This audit will examine the extent to which ETA and states have taken action to follow up on potentially fraudulent CARES Act Unemployment Insurance (UI) claims identified and referred by the OIG.

In September 2022, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) alerted U.S. Department of Labor to over $45 billion in potential fraud paid in four high-risk areas. One high-risk area was Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants filing with suspicious email accounts. Through Employment and Training Administration (ETA), the OIG provided states with underlying methodology as well as specific claimant information for follow-up action. This audit will examine the extent to which ETA and states have taken action to follow up on potentially fraudulent CARES Act UI claims filed with suspicious email accounts identified and referred by the OIG.

Our audit objective was to answer the following questions: (1) What is Kansas’ process for distributing COVID relief funding?; and (2) Have Kansas’ distributions of COVID relief funding been appropriate? The scope of our work included examining the distribution process for CARES Act and American Rescue Plan Act funding. Additionally, we evaluated a sample of CARES Act expenditures made in 42 Kansas counties.

Our audit objective was to answer the question: what entities received Connectivity Emergency Response Grants and where were they located? We found that the Kansas Department of Commerce (Commerce) awarded $48.5 million in Connectivity Emergency Response Grant funds through 66 grants to all seven regions in Kansas with the largest amounts going to South Central, Southwest, and Northeast Kansas. We also found that Commerce denied some applications through its review process.

The objective of this audit is to determine whether cardholders used the Government Purchase Card to support DoD's response to the pandemic in accordance with Federal and DoD policies. We may revise the objective as the audit proceeds, and we will also consider suggestions from management for additional or revised objectives.

The objective of this audit is to determine whether the Military Departments are processing exemption requests for the Coronavirus Disease–2019 vaccination and taking disciplinary actions for active duty Service members in accordance with Federal and DoD guidance. 

We are conducting the subject audit at the request of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform. The objective of this audit is to determine the actions taken by the DoD to configure remote access software used to facilitate telework during the COVID-19 pandemic to protect DoD networks and systems from potential malicious activity. We will also determine the extent to which the DoD implemented security controls to protect remote connections to its networks. We may revise the objective as the audit proceeds, and we will consider suggestions from management for additional or revised objectives.